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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MIKE DR ~-\GO~. and ~I ILl\:~\ ~ 
DR~\.GO~. his wit'P, 
Pia iut iff's and Res ponde-Jds, 
--YS.-
TEDDY G. RrSSELL, and _MAN-
ILLA RFSSELL, his wife, 
Defendants aud ~-1 ppellants. 1 
Case No. 
7568 
Brief of Appellants 
STATE-'IEKr:e OF FACTS 
This is an action in equity in the District Court for 
Salt Lake ( 10unty hetwel'll adjoining property owners 
to quiet title to contested property between them, to 
decree that certain buildings and sewer line construction 
by defendants are an unlawful encumbrance and obstruc-
tion on plaintiffs' property, to compel defendants and 
appellants to remove the alleged building and construc-
tion encroachments from the land claimed by plaintiffs 
alld respondents, and for damages for the alleged tres-
pass. Defendants filed a counterclaim for an alleged 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trespass by plaintiffs and respondents during the period 
of defendants' alleged trespass over the contested boun-
dary line and upon the contested property between the 
parties. The district court struck out the counterclaim 
and awarded judgment and decree to the plaintiffs. 
Teddy Russell and his wife, Manilla Russell, who 
are defendants and appellants herein, purchased and 
took possession of the State rrourist Court at 3114 South 
State Street in Salt Lake County, Utah, during the 
spring or summer of 1943. Their property was some 
65.6 feet more or less in frontage and extended all the 
way through the block in an east-west direction from 
State Street to Main Street. Mike Dragos and his wife, 
plaintiffs and respondents herein, were owners of and 
in possession of an adjoining piece of land directly to 
the north of the Russell property for the full distanee 
westward from State Street of some 495 feet. It is the 
common boundary between the Russell and Dragos 
properties along this 495 foot strip which is in dispute. 
\Vhen the Russells moved onto their property in 
1943, a fence was situated between the Russell and 
Dragos properties for the full distance of the said 495 
feet, marking the line between the properties. (Tr. 60). 
rrhis fence began at the sidewalk on State Street and 
proceeded westward some 87 feet or more as a wire and 
post fence. 'rhe next 37 feet 'vestward were of wire or 
wood, and the balance of the fence westward was of 
posts, barbed wire and wooden boards. (Tr. 61, 62}. The 
rear of the Dragos property westward from State Street 
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wns located, or approximately marked, by the west end 
post of the fence. (Tr. 163, Def. ~~xh. 12). 
It is uncontroverted that the same fence was located 
and fixed between the two properties as early as 1911 
and 1912 as the boundary line between the properties, and 
was so considered by all owners and occupiers of the two 
properties until the latter part of 1948 or early in 1949. 
(Tr. 63, 82, 139, 140, 147-154, 173, 174). Indeed, there 
being no fence or boundary indicator or monument for 
165 feet west from State· Street, and the exact boundary 
being unlocated and in doubt, at least the east 165 feet of 
the fence was extended eastward in 1911 from the older 
western section by the owners of both properties, by 
mutual agreement to locate and fix the boundary line 
between the properties, there being no otherwise fixed 
or known boundary, (Tr. 169) and the actual line being 
tmcertain. ( Tr. 130, 135, 139, 148, 149). The uncertainty 
of the line in 1911 and 1912 is conclusively shown by 
the fact that the fence, believed to be established on 
the boundary line, was at no place located on the true 
survey line, (Def. Exh. 17), (Tr. 51, 52, 62, 98), but 
varied or meandered slightly north of due west. (Tr. 
63), (Def. Exh. 17). The adjoining owners, by agree-
ment, thereby confirmed and established the entire old 
fence line with its eastward extension as the boundary 
between the properties which were later to be owned 
by appellants and respondents respectively. (Tr .. 134, 
135, 137, 138, 139, 148, 149). A joint water well was put. 
down on the agreed line as established by the parties, 
or very near thereto. (Tr. 134, 135, 161, 162). Both the 
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fence and the well were constructed by the joint efforts 
and upon joint determination of location, by the ad-
joining landowners at the time, and trees were planted 
all along the fence line. These facts are also uncontro-
verted. err. 6, 25, 69, 134-139, 161). 
Substantial portions of the old fence, as established 
in 1911 and 1912, remained in place at the time of the 
trial o! the cause, ( Tr. 6, 7, 8, 33, 85, 96, 107-111, 120, 
131, 136, 145, 146, 151, 152, 154-164, 172, 181, 188--lines 
15-27, Tr. 193-194, 197), except for the cinder block 
section of some ten feet placed south of the old fence 
line and eastward from the east end of the tourist court 
cabins by Mike Dragos in 1948 or 1949. (Tr. 32, 86). 
Otherwise, its entire original location was marked by 
the remaining portions, a remaining tree of tho$e planted 
about 1912, old power poles, a well, and other fence 
posts. (Tr. 30-lines 27-30; Tr. 31, 32, 34, Def. Exh. 6, 
Tr. 37, 64, 65, Def. Exh. 1-16; Tr. 69, 70, 85-96, 107-111, 
118, 135, 136, 139, 140, 145, 146, 147, 151, 152, 154, 155, 
157, 158, 162, 163, 166, 169, 193, 194, 197). From time 
to time boards have been added to the fence and re-
moved from it, and a part of the fence was destroyed 
by fire in 1944 or 1945, but was immediately rebuilt at 
the same place. ( Tr. 71-7 4). Regardless of all other 
markers or monuments, the distance north from the line 
of cabins to the old fence line is definitely marked 
beyond all doubt by the remaining tree which both 
plaintiffs and defendants admit is still in place and was 
located along the fence line exactly at the south edge 
thereof. (Tr. 6, 23, 71, 89, 90, 109, 147, 156, 157; Def. 
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Exh. 14, 15). The details of location of the old fence 
in 1911 and 1912 and its continuous location in the same 
place for more than thirty years and until just before 
the trial, are proved by the references given above to 
the testimony of the actual residents and owners of 
both adjoining pieces of property through every year 
from 1911 to 1949. nlany of these witnesses are com-
pletely independent persons with no interest in this 
action. 
From 1911 and 1912 until late in 1944 or 1945, it is 
uncontroverted that all property owners on both sides 
of the fence used the properties right up to the fence 
line on either side of the old fence for their various 
proprietary purposes. (Tr. 44, 135, 139, 146, 147, 148, 
150, 151, 156, 159; Def. Exh. 16; Tr. 174). There is no 
evidence at all that from 1912 until 1944 or 1945 any 
boundary other than the old fence was known or con-
sidered as far as anyone who testified knew or could 
tell. Following 1945, and until the fall of 1948, the evi-
dence is in some conflict on the matter of anyone having 
knowledge or any cause to suspect the boundary line 
might be other than the old fence line. However, the 
plaintiff Mike Dragos testified during the trial that 
he too considers the old fence to constitute his boundary 
line, ( Tr. 18, 29, 30) . and the conflict is solely found in 
the uncorroborated testimony of the two plaintiffs. 
In 1928, Edward B. :McCabe and Mary :McCabe, who 
then owned the State Tourist Court property, con-
structed a line of tourist cabins along and against the 
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old fence. (rrr. 171). There is no record or evidence of 
any objection or protest to this by anyone, (Tr. 174), 
and the McCabes considered that they effected all of 
their construction on their own property. (Tr. 174, 175). 
These ('abins were of wood and were built upon concrete 
foundations laiJ to within some six to nine inches of 
the old fence line as to the north-south sections and 
about three feet south of the fence as to the east-west 
sections. err. 67, 15:J, 165, 171, 172). A few extra such 
foundations were poured by the ~IcCabes on the west 
end of their line of original cabins to permit future 
construction. ('rr. 175 ). In the process of their original 
construction, the .MeCabes extended the back or north 
end of the garage portions of their cabins, located be-
tween dwelling units, all the way northward to the old 
fence itself, and constituted the fence the rear wall of 
the garages. (Tr. 108; Def. Exh. 14; rrr. 159, 160, 165, 
197). This was done by nailing boards to the old fence 
posts (Tr. 173, 176) to make such portions of the fence 
the rear wall or panel of the garages. The remainder 
of the old , fence back of the cabins and between the 
garage sections was also boarded up by the McCabes, 
leaving some three feet of space between the backs of 
the cabins and the old fence to permit space for cleaning 
behind the cabins and to make room for shade trees, 
(Tr. 154, 172), and to avoid the nuisance of a cow and 
chickens then on the adjoining property to the north. 
(Tr. 148, 154, 156.) The McCabes never moved the fence 
in any particular, (Tr. 172, 182), nor did the Russells 
change its position to the north, or at all. (Tr. 73, 74, 
7 :J, 120, 154, 155, 194). 
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rrhe Russells thereafter pulled most of the originally 
planted tret.)s situated along the south ed~e of the old 
fence, but left one tree in plnn', ( rrr. 69, 70, 71; De f. 
Exh. 7, 15 ), and separatdy and by units, renovated the 
cabins, completing some in cintlt.>r block and concrete 
(Tr. 66}, but limiting this construction to the location 
of ~IcCabe 's concrete foundations laid in 1928 south of 
the old fence line. (Tr. 67, 68, 108, 109; Def. Exh. 14; 
Tr. 126, 128). The Russells installed some of the wooden 
cabins on the old concrete foundations at the west end 
of :McCabes' completed cabins. (Tr. 66, 67, 89-91, 95; 
Def. Exh. 8, 11, 15). Various units were completed from 
time to time until August of 1948, when the last unit to 
be renovated was completed. The five on the east end 
were completed by ~lay of 1946. (Tr. 68, 69). As the 
various units were completed, the Russells installed a 
permanent tile and metal sewer line along the north edge 
of the line of cabins. (Def. Exh. 10, Tr. 93-95, Tr. 68). 
All construction was at least six to eight inches south 
of the old fence line, which the Russells, in good· faith, 
continued to consider the boundary line between the 
parties. (Tr. 15, 47, 82, 83, 114, 124, 125, 126, 127). It is 
uncontroverted that extensive al'ld costly construction 
work involving expense to the Russells of many thous-
ands of dollars was completed by way of renovation of 
these cabin·s and installation of a sewer of a permanent 
nature, (Tr. 66, 110, Defs. Exh. 1-15) all with full 
knowledge of the respondents herein, (Tr. 14-15) and 
the only important conflict in the evidence arises upon 
the point as to whether or not the respondents made 
any protest to appellants or had any idea the boundary 
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line might he other than the fence line, during the 
entire period of construction by the Russells. (Tr. 63). 
However, the evidence would seem overwhelming that 
the respondents always considered the old fence the 
actual boundary line between themselves and the Rus-
sells. err. 18, 29) and did not object to the location of 
the fence and the construction by the defendants. (Tr. 
2H, Lines 8-25; rrr. 190-191). The respondent, Mike 
Dragos, testified that when Russell removed part of the 
boards and some posts during renovation construction 
of the cabins, he re-installed the fence at the special 
request of Dragos, to which Dragos never did object 
(rrr. 190-191) until 1949 after the survey was made and 
trouble developed between the parties. (Tr. 191). The 
respondents considered that even the sewer line along 
the north side of the renovated cabins was south of the 
established boundary line, and }fike Dragos so admits. 
(Tr. 34, 35, 36, Def. Exh. 3). 
While the Dragos testimony is that they considered 
the Russells to be clearly encroaching upon their prop-
erty for the entire period of time since renovation of 
these costly and permanent buildings began, that is, for 
several years, (Tr. 14, 15) and so informed the Russells 
and demanded that they moYe back, yet they actually 
did absolutely nothing during this several year period 
to protect their property against the alleged known 
encroachment, and it is a fact, admitted by the plaintiff 
:Mike Dragos, that in August and September of 1948, as 
the sewer line became completed, :Mike Dragos bargained 
for and arranged with Teddy Russell that if Russell 
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would permit him to eoiuwet hi~ ~l·ptie tank to RnssPll 's 
Sewer DraO'os would pay Hnssl)ll tht• sum of $~5.00 e<lSh ' ~ .. 
for the right to eonneet and would pay Russl•ll 's mnu to 
make the eonneetion. Thi8 was aeeomplished in good 
friendship and the money paid to Russell hy .Mik(\ 
Dragos in the Russell home OYL'l' a glass of beer el,r. 35, 
36, 79, 80) about Christmas time, three months after 
the connection 'vas made. During none of these negotia-
tions did respondents object or demand defendants to 
move any of their construction. There is no conflict on 
this vital point, nor is it otherwise explained. It is also 
the uncontroverted evidence that following the initial 
connection, ~like Dragos in 1949 again approached Teddy 
Russell to ask permission to connect the Dragos Tavern 
lavatories to the Russell sewer line, and Dragos agreed 
to pay a further $25.00 for the right to connect, but due 
solely to difficulties of proper drainage Dragos did not 
ultimately make the connection. (Tr. 80, 81). The par-
ties were still, at the time of this second agreement, 
apparently good friends, (Tr. 75) and Russell regularly 
patronized the Dragos Tavern. (Tr. 81). This tavern, 
built by Dragos in 1948 by the same contractor who had 
worked on the Russells' cabins along the fence in the 
beginning of the renovation, was so constructed that its 
walls somewhat parallelled the old fence line and in so 
doing, wandered considerably to ·the north of the later 
determined east-west survey line. The uncontroverted 
testimony is that the tavern was purposely so built to 
stay in line with the old fence. (Def. Exh. 2, 3; Tr. 35, 
111-112). 
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Appellants' evidence is all to the effect that the 
first objection made by the respondents to Russells con-
cerning any claim that Russells were encroaching upon 
the Dragos property came in April of 1949. ( Tr. 75, 76, 
77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82). Russell had experienced his ~rst 
difficulty with :-..1 ike Dragos l'arlier in the spring of 1949 
when he complained to Dragos that customers of the 
Dragos tavern enterprise were continually blocking up 
one of Russell's driveways into his property. The fact 
of this difficulty is uncontroverted. (Tr. 76, 81). About 
this same time the respondents decided to sell their 
property, and for the first time had it surveyed. (Tr. 52, 
53). The Dragos survey, made according to the Dragos 
deed, occurred in April of 1949 (Tr. 16), and disclosed 
that while the fence was located very near to the survey 
line between the properties at the State Street end of 
the fence, a very gradual and slight difference developed 
as the fence proceeded westerly-such that the west end 
of the fence lay about 2.7 feet north of the survey line. 
The survey also showed that the cabins renovated of 
cinder block, while wholly and completely south of the 
old fence line, meandered slightly north as they pro-
ceeded westward approximately parallel with the old 
fence, from a position just south of the survey line at 
the east end of the cinder block cabins to about 2.1 feet 
north of the survey line at the west end of the cinder 
block cabins. (Def. Exh. 17). The width of the sewer line 
was 6 inches, immediately north of the cabins. The 
balance of the cabins westward all appear to be not 
only south of the fence but a]so south of the survey line, 
except for old garage sections going to the fence. (Def. 
10 
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Exh. 17). Following the Drago~ ~urn•y aud tlw filing- of 
this complaint, Husst..•ll eausPd a ~nrn•y to ht> made of his 
north line, which the pa rtiPs agTt..'l'd, is virtually iden-
tical with the Dragos survey, and a chart and certificate 
of surYey showing t1rtails of the old fence line and the 
cabins to the southward, all drawn to scale, have been 
receiYed in eYidence as one of the exhibits for the ap-
pellants. ( Def. Exh. 17). 
In 1948 after all renovation and construction was 
complete, Russell had some question about his south 
line and had it surveyed. (Tr. 110-111). He was not at 
that time in any way concerned about his north line and 
there is no evidence that he was aware at that time of 
any discrepency with his north line. (Tr. 123, 125-126, 
165). 
All the evidence, except for the unsubstantiated 
testimony of the respondents, show·s that none of Rus-
sell's renovation and sewer construction proceeded north 
of the old McCabe foundations or within inches of the 
old fence line. The Russells proceeded entirely in good 
faith (Tr. 15, 47, 48, 124, 127) and at great cost to them-
selves. The Dragos stood by and did absolutely nothing 
during the entire period of construction, a period of 
about five years and according to some of the evidence, 
seven years, except to approve and recognize the full 
propriety of even the sewer location, the northernmost 
part of the work done by the Russells. The weight of 
the evidence shows that it was not until trouble developed 
over the respondents' tavern operation and respondents 
11 
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contemplated ~clling their land that either respondents 
or appellants or any of their predecessors in title back 
to 1912 had any idea that a survey line might be located 
differently from the fence line, which since 1912 at least, 
had been the established and res.pected boundary line 
between the properties (Tr. 18). 
Actual measurement of the width of the Dragos 
property at its west end and northward from the west 
end of the old fence to the west end of the fence on the 
north side of the Dra.gos land is not only the full 66 
feet claimed by the respondents but 671;2 feet. (Tr. 83, 
84, 85. Def. Exh. 12). The respondents thus not only 
now claim their north fence as their boundary line but 
claim an additional 2.7 feet south of the old fence at its 
west end and thereby giving them not 66 but 70.2 feet 
in width of property at their west end. (Tr. 23, 24, 54). 
The respondents state that all they claim is 66 feet of 
land at the east end and also the west end of their prop-
erty. (Tr. 23, 24, 25, 54). They further claim only 66 
feet south from their north fence line which they claim 
is correctly positioned. (Tr. 37, 40). :Mike Dra.gos and 
Milka Dragos then testified that their only claim against 
the Russells 'vas on account of construction work north 
of the old fence line (Tr. 27, 30, 31, 52), and Milka 
Dragos claims one cannot now even tell where the old 
fence was located. (Tr. 49, 52). The respondent, Mike 
Dragos, also claims he owns the well drilled jointly on 
or near the old fence line in 1911. (Tr. 32, Def. Exh. 3, 
6). Notwithstanding the testimony of respondents that 
the old fence did not reach northward to the power 
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poles, and permitted them to pas~ between the fem•t• 
and the poles, the uncontradieted testimony i~ t ha 1 rl'-
spondents in building their own fence, stopped short of 
one of tht> power poles to permit passage north of the 
pole through a gate: (Tr. 191, 192-3) and further one 
of the occupants of the Russell property in 1911 testi-
fied the old fence was '•right next to t h0 pole'' and "was 
up against it·' and had not been changed when she 
moved away in 1~28. (Tr. 92-3, 131, 136, 140). It is 
appa1·ent that plaintiffs are not at all clear as to what 
they should claim and just how they are injured. 
During the first few months of 1949, the plaintiffs 
and respondents removed and changed a portion of the 
old fence running eastward from the tourist cabins to 
a point and line south of the former location of the 
fence and then piled on the land thus gained, quantities 
of brick, blocks and other material, thereby encroaching 
and trespassing upon land of appellants. Appellants' 
counterclaim for this cause of action was stricken by 
the Court upon motion of respondents. 
Following entry of the judgment herein, defendants 
filed their motion for a new trial which the court by its 
subsequent order denied in toto. The motion was based 
upon: 
(l) newly discovered evidence which though material 
was not capable of discovery through any exercise of 
reasonable diligence during the trial of the cause and 
to the effert that the power poles along the fence line 
13 
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and in place at the time of the trial were in fact 
originally placed along the old fence line more than 
30 years prior to the filing of the complaint, and 
further that the original poles had been replaced in 
the same place occupied by the original poles ten 
to fifteen years before the filing of the complaint; 
and 
(2) that the judgment and the decree were against the 
evidence and the law. 
srrATEJ\fENT OF POINTS 
1. The complaint fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. 
2. The Court erred 1n granting plaintiffs' motion 
to strike both counterclaims No. 1 and No. 2 from de-
fendants' answer and counterclaim. 
3. The evidence is insufficient to support the find-
ings of the Court and the findings are contrary to the 
evidence as follows : 
a. As specified in paragraph No. 1 of the find-
ings that ''During all times herein mentioned 
and prior to commencement of this action 
plaintiffs ha1Te been ... in possession of the 
following described real property ... '' 
b. As specified in paragraph ~ o. 3 of the findings 
that ''On or about the month of October, 1943, 
the defendants began the construction of a 
motel and began to erect on the north part of 
their lot a number of cabins." 
14 
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c . ..:-\~ sperified in paragraph Ko. -l- of tlw finding~ 
that '• said rabins and :::.L~wer pipe linP \\'ere 
eonstrnded oYer into p1nintiff::4' l:nl(l notwith-
standing the prote~ts of plaintiffs and ngnin~t 
their ronsent ~ that prior to the ron1meurement 
of thi.~ artion plaintiffs have made demands 
upon the defendants to remoYe said buildings 
and sPwer line from their premises but al-
though defendants han_• made many promises 
to do ~o. they have refused and neglected to 
take do-wn and remove the same or any part 
thereof.'' 
d. ..:-\s specified in paragraph No. 5 thereof: 
''That the said described land of the plain-
tiffs is of great value ... and plaintiffs are 
prevented from using and occupying the whole 
of their land f~r such purpose by reason of 
the intrusion of the buildings and sewer line 
erected by the defendants and that plaintiffs' 
land is greatly diminished and the same is 
made unsalable and the plaintiffs are greatly 
damaged. 
e. ) .. s specified in paragraph X o. 7 thereof: "that 
said fence was located on the legal boundary 
line separating said two parcels of land be-
longing to the plaintiffs and the defendants.'' 
f. The findings and particularly paragraph No. 7 
thereof fail to sett]e the issue of fact as to 
whether or not the fence line between the 
parties as existing for more than thirty years 
by way of the legal boundary was located on 
the slnTey line between the parties according 
to the deed descriptions of the parties or to 
the northward thereof and whether or not de-
fendants ever encroached over and northwan1 
of said fence line. 
g. Paragraph Xo. 8 of the findings and each and 
every fincling therein. 
15 
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4. That the findings and conclusions are inconsistent 
or ambiguous and are insufficient to sustain the judg-
ment and decree herein. 
5. rrhat the Court erred in not finding upon the 
issue and thereafter concluding as a matter of law that 
as to all construetion of defendants north of the deed 
survey line between the parties, or at least as to all 
separate construction done or eompleted prior to 6 May, 
1946, one or more of the statutes of limitation were a 
bar to action thereupon by the plaintiffs. 
6. The Court should have granted appellants' mo-
tion for a new trial. 
7. The findings, conclusions and decree are insuf-
ficient, in error and against the law in finding, conclud-
ing and decreeing that under the evidence and the law 
the plaintiffs and respondents are entitled to the pos-
session of all the land described in paragraph No. 1 of 
the complaint and that a mandatory injunction should 
issue requiring the defendants and appellants to remove 
all construction in any way located on such described 
land rather than to determine and then require de-
fendants to pay to plaintiffs the value of any land en-
croached upon. 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AHGU ~lEN'l' 
l. 
DOES THE COl\IPLAINT FAIL rro STATE 
A CLAil\l UPOX 'VHICH RELIEF CAN BE 
GRANTED? 
Part of the Complaint in plain terms and language 
avers that plaintitrs have been at all times mentioned in 
said complaint and • • prior to commencement of this 
action'' and now are the owners and in possession of all 
the land claimed by plaintiffs. Based on Par. 1 of their 
complaint, plaintiffs have no grievance or cause for 
''ction against defendants. The paragraph is essential 
to the complaint because it describes all of the property 
claimed by plaintiffs in the complaint and sets forth the 
necessary allegations of ownership and possession to 
comply with Sections 104-2-5 and 6 U.C.A. 1943. 
The allegations in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the 
complaint are in conflict and do not cure the defect. 
Further, it is not clear from paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of 
the complaint whether the same lot referred to in Par. 1 
of the complaint or some other lot of the plaintiffs is 
being encroached upon by defendants. 
17 
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II. 
DID rrHE UOURT ERR lX GRA~TING PLAIN-
rriFFS' :\IOrriON TO STRll{E BOTH COUNTER-
CLAI11S ~<>. 1 A~D ~0. 2 FROM DEFENDANTS' 
ANSWER A:\']) COUNTERCLAJM ~ 
Counterclaim X o. 1 (page 4 of defendants' answer 
and counterclaim) is a cause of action for a counter 
trespass occurring during the same period plaintiffs 
complain of (lefendants' trespass and encroachment and 
arising over the same contested boundary line situation 
and depends for its determination on the same essential 
issue as to whether the legal boundary line between the 
parties is to be located on the old fence line or whether 
on the survey line delineating the deed description of 
the properties of the parties. This counterclaim arises 
.out of the identical boundary line dispute and the issues 
to be determined are almost identical. It would seem 
clear that the counterclaim is definitely within the pur .. 
view of Sec. 104-9-2(1) UCA. 1943 and Rules 13(a) and 
13(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requiring 
that the counterclaim arise out of the transaction set 
forth in the complaint or be connected with the subject 
of the action and particularly is within Rule 13 (b) pro-
viding for permissive counterclaims not arising out of 
the transaction or subject matter of the action stated in 
the complaint. It is true that the rules of civil procedure 
were not effective until January of 1950 and that the 
order striking counterclaim No. 1 was made in July of 
1949. Ho,vever, in view of the intent of the rules that 
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the widest latitude exi8t to permit filing of n couHtPr·· 
claim, and this entire action hndng been treated as an 
equity action and the appellate court haYing the power 
to review the entire record, (Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 
57, 2'76 P. 912, 69 .A.L.R. 1-:l-17), it would appear that 
the court should permit defendants' counterclaim No. 1 
to be tried in this action upon the occasion of any 
remittitur for the taking of new or additional evidence. 
III. 
IS THE EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE FIKDINGS OF THE COURT AND ARE 
THE FINDINGS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE: 
a. As specified in Par. 1 of the findings that "Dur-
ing all times herein mentioned and prior to commence-
ment of this action plaintiffs have been in possession of 
the following described real property . . . '' ~ Plaintiffs' 
complaint in paragraphs No. 3, 4 and 5 alleges that in 
fact defendants took wrongful possession of plaintiffs' 
property by building over onto plaintiffs' property and 
staying there, thereby preventing use and occupation 
not only of the area of encroachment but of the whole 
of the plaintiffs' land. If the plaintiffs during all times 
mentioned in the complaint were in fact in possession 
of all of their land, then plaintiffs have nothing to 
complain of. The plaintiffs complain (paragraphs 3, 4 
and 5 of the complaint) that plaintiffs were in fact not 
in possession of all of their land as claimed in Par. 1 of 
the complaint since the first day any construction of 
the defendants was made o\·er the line delineating the 
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property therein described. (Plaintiffs' Exh. A, Tr. 17, 
51). rrhe evidence shows that plaintiffs and their pre-
decessors since 1912 were never in possession of any 
land south of the old fence line between the parties and 
that the fence line was located for virtually all of its 
distance somewhat to the north of the south line of the 
description in plaintiffs' deed (Pis. Exh. 1, Tr. 44, 63, 
82, 135, 139, 140, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151, 154, 156, 159, 
173, 174, Defs. Exhibits 16 and 17). It is admitted, how-
ever, that plaintiffs were in possession of the great 
majority of the property called for by their deed. (Tr. 
24, 25, Def. Exh. 6, Tr. 33). 
b. As specified in paragraph No. 3 of the findings 
that "On or about the month of October, 1943, the de-
fendants began the construction of a motel and began 
to erect on the north part of their lot a number of 
cabins''~ The evidence is conclusive on the part of 
both plaintiffs and defendants and from other witnesses 
that cabins existed on property of the defendants and 
along the disputed boundary line since 1928 and that 
defendants began renovation or remodeling in 1943. 
There is no evidence whatsoever that in 1943 defendants 
''began the construction of a motel'' and ''began to 
erect ... a number of cabins." The evidence is, of 
course, that the motel and cabins had clearly been in 
existence for fifteen years when defendants began reno-
vation in 1943. and for more than twenty years when 
plaintiffs filed their complaint in 1949. (Tr. 12, 44-45, 
63, 66-67, 68, 171, 180). 
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c. As specified in Par. 4 of the findings that "Haid 
cahi ns and sewer pipe line were l'onstructed ovPr into 
plaintiffs' land notwithstanding the protestH of plain-
tiffs and against their consent; that prior to the com-
mencement of this action, plaintiffs have made demands 
upon the defendants to remove said buildings and sewer 
line from their premises, but although defendants have 
made many promisl'S to do so, they have refused and 
neglected to take down and remove the same or any part 
thereof"¥ The record contains no reference whatsoever 
to any promises of the defendants to remove and take 
down any eonstruction at all or any construction alleged 
by plaintiffs to be an encroachment upon their property, 
nor does the record eontain any faets indicating an ad-
mission, express or implied, that defendants or either 
of them knew they were building over onto plaintiffs' 
land or even north of the old fenee to any extent at all. 
Instead and aside from the uneorroborated and contra-
dietory testimony of Mike Dragos and his wife (Tr. 14-
lines 18-21, Tr. 190-lines 24-30 and 191-lines 1-7, Tr. 
35-36, Tr. 49-lines 1-12, Tr. 52-lines 25-30 and Tr. 
53-lines 1-7, Tr. 53) the evidence is eonsistently dear 
that all eonstruetion by defendants was done under 
claim of right, without protest on the part of the plain-
tiffs, was with plaintiffs tacit, if not express eonsent, 
acquieseence and approval, was open and notorious, was 
reeognized by the plaintiffs themselves as rightfully 
done by the defendants and when eompleted, was the 
property of the defendants to the extent of the northern-
most part of any eonstruction done by the defendants, 
the sewer line. It further is the uneontradieted fact 
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that the respective properties were used right up to 
the old fence line on both sides by the respective owners 
and occupants while considering the fence the property 
line for 32 years before defendants began any con-
struction and for 38 years before plaintiffs filed their 
complaint. It would further appear conclusive that no 
renovation or construction was effected by the defend-
ants north of the old fence line. 
d. As specified in Par. 5 thereof ''That the said 
described land of the plaintiffs is of great value ... and 
plaintiffs are prevented from using and occupying the 
whole of their land for such purpose by reason of the 
intrusion of the buildings and sewer line erected by the 
defendants and that plaintiffs' land is greatly diminished 
and the same is made unsalable and the plaintiffs are 
greatly damaged ... "'? The record is entirely devoid 
of any evidence that plaintiffs' land is of great value, 
is situated in any business district, is suitable for busi-
ness purposes and plaintiffs are prevented from using 
and occupying the \Vhole of their land or more than an 
unnoticeable and minute part of it due to any con-
struction by defendants, that plaintiffs' land is greatly 
diminished or to any extent more than such almost im-
perceptible and unused portion along the south boundary 
of their lot, that the same was made unsalable or that 
plaintiffs were greatly damaged or at all (Def. Exhibits 
1-17). 
e. As specified in Par. 7 thereof '' ... that said 
fence was located on the legal boundary line separating 
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said two parcels of land belonging to the plaintiffs and 
the defendants"? It is impossible to know from snell 
finding \Yhether tlw · •lt:gal boundary'' 1nentioned is the 
line called for by the deed of the plaintiffs or the line of 
the old fence Yery slightly north of the deed line, and 
which the defendants contend, under the facts, became 
the legal boundary for the purposes of this action. If 
the finding is meant to locate the old fence right along 
the deed line, then the evidence in this case is almost 
conclusive that the old fence going westward, meandered 
to the north and was located for most of its distance 
slightly north of the deed line and did not at any point 
coincide with the deed line. (Def. Exhibits 17 and 18, 
Tr. 98-104, Def. Exhibits 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14 and 
15, Tr. 85, 86, 87-89 incl., Tr. 25-lines 13-25, Tr. 69-
lines 8-30 and Tr. 70-line 1, Tr. 71-75 incl., Tr. 62-65 
incl., Tr. 67-68, Tr. 106-lines 8-9, Tr. 117, 90-91, 89-90, 
91-92, 92-93, 93-95, 95-96, 107 -108). 
f. The findings nowhere and particularly in Par. 7 
thereof determine and settle the issue of fact as to 
whether or not the fence line between the parties as 
existing for more than thirty years as the legal boundary 
was located on the survey line between the parties ac-
cording to the deed descriptions of the parties or to 
the northward thereof and whether or not defendants 
ever encroached over and northward of said fence line. 
·Defendants' affirmative defenses 6(b) and 6(d) (Par. 2 
of the answer and counterclaim) allege the fence line 
"·as the boundary line between the parties and in de-
fense 6(e) (Par. 2 of the answer and counterclaim) that 
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the entire construction of defendants was south of the 
fence line. These allegations raised the issue of fact 
of the location of the fence line as compared to any dif-
ferent boundary line called for by the deeds of the 
partieH and required a finding and also a conclusion of 
law as to whether the fence was located apart from the 
deed line and if so was it the legal boundary between 
the parties for the purpose of this action. If the fence 
was north of the deed line and was the legal boundary, 
then the issue of whether defendants effected any con-
struction north of the fence remained. It is elementary 
that a finding must be made on each material issue of 
fact raised by the pleadings and a conclusion of law 
determined on each material issue of law raised by the 
pleadings and the facts as found. (2 Bancroft's Code 
Practice and Remedies 2157-par. 1677, page 2158-Par. 
1679, page 2159-par. 1680, page 2170-par. 1690, page 
2172-par. 1692, page 2175-par. 1695 et seq.) 
g. As specified in Par. 8 of the findings that "The 
court finds the issues in favor of the plaintiffs and 
against the defendants and further finds that the affir-
mative issues raised in defendants' answer are not sup-
ported by the evidence and the court finds on said de-
fenses in favor of the plaintiffs and against the de-
fendants''~ 
( 1) As to defense 6 (a) (page 2 of the answer and 
counterclaim) the evidence is uncontradicted that de-
fendants simply renovated or remodeled cabins upon 
the identical foundations of earlier cabins laid down in 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 ~}~8. did not eonst.ruet northward of sue.h foundations 
and all eon~t ruction, ineluding tht) sewer on the north 
was in all eases south of the old fence line. (Tr. 67, 68, 
108,109, 15, 47, 82, 83, 124, 126, 12i, Def. Exhibits 1-17). 
(::!) As to the defense 6(b) (page 2 of the answer 
and counterclaim), the eourt 's finding No. 7 is direetly 
in aceord with the matters alleged therein and the evi-
dence i~ overwhelming and clear in support thereof, 
throughout the transcript. 
(3) As to the defense 6( e) (page 2 of the answer 
and counterclaim) the plaintiffs admit the truth thereof 
and the testimony for the defendants is eonsistently in 
support thereof (Tr. 44, 63, 82, 135, 139, 140, 146, 147, 
148, 150, 151, 154, 156, 159, Def. Exhibits 16 and 17, Tr. 
174). The oceupant of the Russell property in 1911 
testified that in 1911 the respective owners of the ad-
joining properties in question settled the doubtful 
boundary line situation between them by establishing a 
new fence as an extension of the older fence line and 
constituting the fence as the aetual boundary line be-
tween the parties. No other boundary line ever appears 
to have been definitely known, (Tr. 139-140), until 1949. 
(Tr. 16, 52, 53, Def. Exh. 17). 
·)-
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IV. 
ARE THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
INCONSISrrENT OR AMBIGUOUS AND INSUFFI-
CIENT TO SUSTAIN THE JUDGMENT AND DE-
CREE' 
a. Par. 1 of the findings stating that plaintiffs at 
all times were in possession of all land described in 
their deed is directly controverted by paragraphs 3, 4, 
5 and 6 of the findings which in substance state that 
defendants were encroaching upon and were actually 
in possession of part of such land to the extent of their 
construction north of the south boundary of the plain-
tiffs' described land. The uncontradicted evidence is 
that the plaintiffs had more land even between their 
north fence and the old fence line between the parties 
to this action than plaintiffs' deed called for (Tr. 83, 84, 
85, Defs. Exhibit 12) and plaintiffs claimed every bit 
of such ground as being the ground called for by their 
deed (Tr. 23, 24, 54). It is thus clear that if finding No.1 
stands, in view of the evidence as to the extent of land 
possessed and claimed by plaintiffs north of the old 
fence behveen the parties, findings No.3, 4, 5 and 6 must 
fall as well as the decree. 
v. 
DID THE COURT ERR IN NOT FINDING 
UPON THE ISSUE AND THEREAFTER CON-
CLUDING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT AS TO 
ALL CONSTRUCTIOX OF DEFENDANTS i\ORTH 
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r_ 
:c 
OF 1,HE DEED SURVEY LINE BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES, OR ~-\.T LEAST AS TO ALL SEPARATE 
COXSTRrCTION DONE OR C'Ol\TPLETED PRIOR 
TO 6 ~lAY, 1946, OXE OR ~IORg OF THE STA-
TUTES OF LL\IITATION \VEHE A BAH TO AC-
TIOX THER.El~PO~ BY THE PLAINTIFFS 1 
The evidence is uncontradicted that the property on 
the south side of the old fence was used for cabin pur-
poses right up to the old fence since 1928 ( T:r:. 67, 155, 
165, 171-174, 66, 110). The defendants, according to 
the overwhelming evidence did not effect any construc-
tion north of the old fence line (Tr. 67, 68, 108, 109, 
126, 128, 66, 89-91, 95, 15, 47, 82, 83, 124, 127, Defs. Ex-
hibits 1-17) and the old fence line remained at the date 
of the trial substantially where it had always been (Tr. 
6-8, 33, 85, 96, 107-111, 120, 131, 136, 145, 146, 151, 152, 
154-164, 172, 181, 18~lines 15-27, 193-194, 197). The 
evidence is again virtually unanimous that the fence 
was considered the boundary between the parties and so 
respected by the adjoining owners and their predeces-
sors in title since about 1911 or 1912 and it was recog-
nized that the respective owners were enttiled to the 
land on each side of the fence right up to the fence (Tr. 
44, 63, 82, 135, 139, 140, 146-154, 156, 159, 173, 174, Defs. 
Exhibits 1-17). Indeed, there can be no doubt but that 
the owners on each side of the fence were in open, 
~; notorious and exclusive possession of the land under 
full claim of right all the way to the old fence line. It 
follows that defendants and their continuous chain of 
predecessors in title since 1911 were in possession of 
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all of the land south of the old fence line. Plaintiffs or 
their predecessors were not and could not have been in 
possession of any land south of the old fence and were 
therefore not seised of or in possession of any of the 
land south of the old fence line since at least 1912. Plain- · 
tiffs are therefore barred in this action for the recovery 
of their property or the possession thereof by the direct 
provisions of Sections 104-2-5 and 6, U.C.A. 1943 as 
follows: 
Sec. 104-2-5 : No action for the recovery of real 
property or for the possession thereof shall be 
maintained, unless it appears that the plaintiff, 
his ancestor, grantor or predecessor was seised 
or possessed of the property in question within 
seven years before commencement of the action ... 
Sec. 104-2-6: No cause of action, or defense or 
counterclaim to an action, founded upon the title 
to real property or to rents or profits out of the 
same, shall be effectual, unless it appears that 
the person prosecuting the action, or interposing 
the defense or counterclaim, or under whose title 
the action is prosecuted, or defense or counter-
claim is made, or the ancestor, predecessor or 
grantor of such person was seised or possessed 
of the property in question within seven years 
before the eommitting of the act in respect to 
which such action is prosecuted or defense or 
counterclaim made ... 
These sections were added to as regards tax titles by 
the 1943 session laws but were not changed as to any 
of the provisions cited. 
Bozievich v. Slechta, et al., 109 Utah 373, 166 P. 
2d 239. 
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Lar~l'll Y. Onesite. ~1 Utah 38, 5~} P. 2:~4. 
~ee also ~Iorrow, et al. Y. Con~t Land Co., :2~) Cal. 
..:\. pp. ~d 92, 84 p. ~d 301. 
Since thi~ action is, in addition to being one based 
on title to land and for the recovery of possession of 
the same, also one for trespass upon and injury to real 
property, it seems dear that Sec. 104-2-24 U.C.A. 1943 
would further bar relief to the plaintiffs for any con-
struction on the part of defendants completed prior to 
6 May, 1946. The section requires commencement of 
an action within three years upon '' (1) An action for 
waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; ... '' 
The evidence shows that the easternmost six cabins 
of the line of cabins alleged to be encroaching on plain-
tiffs' land, were finished as a separate series of renova-
tion of cabins by the summer of 1946 ( Tr. 68-69), and 
the east five of these were of cinder block and finished 
first (Tr. 66). It would thus appear that a considerable 
portion, if not all of the construction and renovation of 
at least the five eastern cabins were completed by 6 May 
1946, three years prior to filing of this action, including 
foundations, floors, walls and sewer connection. This 
construction was obviously open and notorious and plain-
tiffs admit they were aware of it from the beginning 
(Tr. 13, 14, 15, 47). It is submitted that as to the con-
~truction completed prior to 6 ~fay, 1946, plaintiffs are 
limited at the most to the value of any land which it 
might be determined defendants encroached upon with 
their renovation. (See Salt Lake Investment Co. v. 
Railroad, 46 Utah 203, 148 P. 439). 
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VI. and VII. 
DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW 
'rRIAL and 
ARE 'rHE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND 
DECREE INSUFFICIENT, IN ERROR AND 
AGAINST THE LAW IN FINDING, CONCLUDING 
AND DECREEING THAT UNDER THE EVIDENCE 
AND THE LAW THE PLAINTIFFS AND RE-
SPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE POSSES-
SION OF ALL THE LAND DESCRIBED IN PARA-
GRAPH NO. 1 OF THE COMPLAINT AND THAT 
A MANDATORY INJUNCTION SHOULD ISSUE 
REQUIRING DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
TO REMOVE ALL CONSTRUCTION IN ANY WAY 
LOCATED ON SUCH DESCRIBED LANDT 
Defendants' motion for a new trial rested first on 
newly discovered evidence tending to prove that the old 
fence between the parties was located well to the north-
ward of any construction by defendants and that the 
location of the old fence for more than thirty years 
prior to the filing of the complaint could not be in doubt 
under the new evidence. Specifically, the new evidence 
would show that power poles, located and referred to 
by testimony and the exhibits in the case (Tr. 63, 65, 
72, 191-193, 92-93, 107, 108, 131, 136, 140, 194, Defs. Ex-
hibits 7, 10, 9, 4, 17), were in existence and located in 
the same place as shown in the exhibits for more than 
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thirty years prior to filing of t ht> complaint and were 
simply replaced by the present poles within ten to 
fifteen years just prior to the complaint. This evidence 
would further directly refute the testimony of the 
plaintiff, Mike Dragos, that the poles were installed as 
late as 1936 (Tr. 189). Such evidence is material on 
the issue of the actual location of the old fence and as 
to whether defendants could possibly have effected any 
of their construction northward of the old fence line. 
It should be recalled that the eourt found that the old 
fence existed for more than thirty years prior to the 
complaint upon the boundary line between the parties 
(Par. 7 of the Findings of Fact). 
The second ground of the motion for a new trial was 
that the judgment and deeree was against the evidence 
and the law. Appellants' point VII may be here argued 
as part of the same general problem. Defendants submit 
that the entire transcript, taken in connection with the 
exhibits in the case show by consistent evidenee from 
defendants and many independent witnesses, and by 
conflicting testimony from the plaintiffs the conclusive 
and over,vhelming preponderance of the evidenee that 
the defendants renovated cabins beginning in 1943; fin-
ished at least five of them in May of 1946; effeeted the 
construction entirely upon space oecupied by eabins 
since 1928 and upon foundations thereof and did not 
construct anything north of the old fence line which 
existed in plaee and along a line marked by an old 
cedar post at its west end (Tr. 188-lines 15-27, 152, 
193-197 incl., Defendants' Exhibits 5, 12 and 17), a 
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remaining tree planted about 1912 or earlier (Tr. 69-70, 
90, 135, 147, 156-157, 169), the power poles (Tr. 30, 61, 
64, 65, 72, 73, 7 4, 92, 94, 136, 140, 158, 193, 194, 197), 
the well (rrr. 61, 87, 134, 135, 146, 161, 173), and the 
concrete foundations originally poured by the McCabes 
(67, 90, 95, 155, 172, Defs. Exhibit 8) extending to 
within about six inches of the old fence (note that these 
are all relatively permanent monuments); that the .said 
fence was acquiesced in as to position and location and 
was considered and respected as the boundary line be-
tween the respective parties for more than thirty years 
next preceding filing of the complaint; that construc-
tion was very costly to defendants, was of a relatively 
permanent nature and was completed without objection 
by plaintiffs and with their approval and recognition of 
its propriety and validity until the fall of 1948 or the 
spring of 1949 ; the work was done under full claim of 
right and was ·open, notorious and known to plaintiffs 
from the beginning; the encroachment over the deed 
survey line is very small indeed, is of minute compara-
tive damage to plaintiffs and plaintiffs do not appear 
to have any new or different use for the land alleged 
encroached upon than they had for it prior to 1949 when 
they acquiesced in the position of the old fence line and 
prior to 1943 when admittedly there was universal 
acquiescence in the position of the old fence and de-
fendants had not begun any construction. The exhibits 
show no interference by the construction of defendants 
with any activity or structures of the plaintiffs. The 
encroachment, if any, has resulted in plaintiffs and their 
predecessors in title being out of possession of the small 
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portion of land encroached upon since 1911 and ch·arly 
~iiH'L' 19~~ when the same use of the land l'IH'roaehed 
upon was instituted in favor of defendants' predecessor 
in title as was to continue thereaftt>r through 1943 to 
1949 under the defendants. 
If it be admitted for the purpose of this argument 
that defendants haYe effected eostly and expensive con-
~truction of a permanent nature upon land of the plain-
tiffs, to a slight extent, and plaintiffs are not for any 
other reason without a right or remedy, then it would 
appear that in this situation the court should not require 
defendants to remove the construction. Rather, in view 
of the peeuliar facts, plaintiffs are in equity to be denied 
a mandatory injunction and rightly limited to a recovery 
of the ·value of the land encroached upon. The rule is 
well stated in 1 Am. Jur. 516 et seq., par. 19 as follows: 
"While the right to a mandatory injunction under 
proper circumstances is firmly established, the 
injunction may be refused because of the absence 
of proper circumstances, or especially because 
of inequitable incidents ... The same exception 
(denial of the injunction and awarding damages 
to cover the value of the portion of land occupied 
by the encroachment) is made in favor of a bona 
fide trespasser where his damage, if compelled to 
remove the encroachment would be greatly dis-
proportionate to the injury of which the plaintiff 
complains by reason of the encroachment, for the 
general rule is that the extraordinary remedy of 
injunction is allowable only when strong reasons 
therefore are shown.'' 
This doctrine is certainly not new. In 1888, in the case 
of Hunter v. Carroll, 64 N.H. 572, 15 Atl. 17, 14 A.L.R. 
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836, the court refused to order the removal of a building 
which encroached. at one point 7.45 feet, and another 
building which encroached 4.95 feet, upon land of the 
complainant, where the complainant might apparently 
be fully compensated and the land itself recovered in 
proceedings at law; but, if not, it was held that equity 
would not aid in the attempt since the injury to 'the 
complainant was very small and could be compensated 
and the defendant would be subjected to great incon-
venience and expense in removing the buildings which 
were erected innocently and with no intent to trespass 
upon the complainant's land. 
To the same effect are Delorme v. Cusson (1897) 
28 Can. S.C. 66 and Goldbacher v. Eggers (1902) 38 
Misc. 36, 76 N.Y. Supp. 881, affirmed 1903, 82 App. Div. 
637, 84 N.Y. Supp. 1127 and affirmed in 1904 17~ N.Y. 
551, 71 N .E. 1131. Other and later cases to the same 
effect are collected in 14 A.L.R. at page 835 et seq., 31 
A.L.R. 1302 and 96 A.L.R. 1291 et seq. 
Of course, each case must rest on its own circum-
stances. (Glinn v. Silver (1916) 64 Pa. Super. Ct. 383, 
96 A.L.R. 1291), and in this case it would appear that 
all the equities are with the defendants and appellants. 
They accomplished all building under claim of right (Tr. 
15, 47, 48, 82, 83, 114, 124, 125, 126, 127) and at the most 
were guilty of mutual error with plaintiffs and plaintiffs' 
predecessors in title and occupancy as to the location 
of the true boundary. Their construction is extremely 
expensive and difficult to remove and the damage, if 
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any, to plaintiffs is extremely small, and although the 
plaintiff~ liYed within a few f(\et of all construction 
complained of from 1943 through 1948, they took no 
steps to stop construction, or if in doubt as to the line, 
even make a survey. The final and convincing act of 
the plaintiffs and respondents came in 1948 after all 
construction had been completed and Mike Dragos bar-
gained for and paid defendants for the right to connect 
their cesspool to defendants' sewer line, the part of 
defendants' construction of greatest alleged encroach· 
ment, under circumstances indicating plaintiffs were 
entirely pleased with the arrangement and the construc-
tion situation. Thus while the evidence is in direct con-
flict, to the extent of the uncorroborated testimony of 
the two plaintiffs, as to whether any objection at all 
was ever made by plaintiffs to any of the construction 
for any reason, the great, conclusive weight of the evi-
dence would appear to require the finding that no pro-
test was in fact made until the fall of 1948 or the spring 
of 1949. 
In support of the position of defendants and appel-
]ants with respect to the old fence line having become 
the legal boundary between themselves and plaintiffs 
and respondents, the attention of the Court is directed 
to the leading case of Davis vs. Lynha1n, 67 Utah 283, 
247 Pac. 294. In that case the facts were remarkably 
similar to the facts in this case. The Court quotes the 
findings of the Lower Court in its opinion as the facts 
in the case as follows: 
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"that said boundary line as herein last above de-
scribed has been acquiesced and agreed in and to 
by the plaintiff and these defendants and their 
predecessors in interest for more than 20 years 
next prior to the last date hereinabove named. 
that said line has been marked, fixed, defined, and 
determined by the building upon said line and a 
maintenance thereon of a substantial boundary 
line fence which fence as a boundary line has been 
acquiesced in and agreed to by the plaintiff and 
defendants and their predecessors in interest for 
the time hereinabove set out, after evidence by 
the fact that the defendants or their predecessors 
in interest have permitted old trees to stand along 
the boundary line as hereinabove described, to 
which old trees there have been attached the wires 
completing the fence; which trees today stand 
along and mark said boundary line; that defend-
ants or their predecessors in interest, at least 15 
years next prior to the date of the trial of this 
cause of action, built and constructed a buggy 
house and lean-to along said fence line, making 
the northerly side of said buggy house and lean-to 
part of said fence line ... that plaintiff and his 
predecessors in interest have continuously and 
uninterruptedly, for a period of more than 20 
years next prior to the date last above referred 
to, occupied and used their said land up to said 
fence and boundary line without molestation or 
objection on the pa~t of the defendants, or either 
of them or their predecessors in interest; . . . 
that said boundary line, as established and fixed 
by said fence as herein set out for more than 20 
years next prior to the 1st day of May, 1922, has 
neYer been disturbed or molested by the defend-
ants or either of them or their predecessors in 
interest, but has at all times been acknowledged, 
acquiesced in, and mutually agreed to and recog-
nized by plaintiff these defendants, and their 
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preth•ec·ssors in inll•rpst as the true ~"'\.ed and ?e-
termined boundary line behn•Pll thetr n•HJ)('ci t\'e 
lands.'' 
The Court held that the old fence• line under such 
circumstances amounted to an agreed boundary line 
which the Court was not justified in disturbing. 
In connection with the matter of a prior uncertainty 
or dispute as to the location of the true boundary line 
in connection with establishing a fence as an agreed 
boundary line, the Court's attention is directed to 
the case of Hannah rs. Pogue, CaL App. 138 P. 2d 
790, where an old fence line marking the boundary 
between adjoining property owners had existed in a 
certain location for more than 20 years prior to the 
action arising out of a dispute as to the true line, and 
it appearing that there was no direct evidence of any 
dispute or uncertainty, the Court holds in the decision 
at Page 797 of 138 P. 2d: 
''Appellant urges that there is no proof that 
there was ever any uncertainty of agreement as 
to the location of the true boundary line. Al-
though there is no direct evidence to that effect, 
yet the facts found to exist justify the inference 
that the previous owners had agreed upon the 
location of the boundary line. An agreement fix-
ing a boundary line need not be established by 
direct evidence, but may be inferred by conduct, 
and especially by long acquiescence. The agree-
ment must be express or implied from the acts 
of the parties and acquiesced in for the period 
fixed by the statute of limitations. A presumption 
that an agreement formerly was made as to the 
location of a boundary line may arise from the 
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fact that one or hoth of the adjoining owners 
have definitely defined such line by erecting a 
fence or other monument on it and both have 
treated the same as fixing the boundary between 
them for such length of time that neither ought 
to be denied the correctness of its location. Board 
of Trustees v. Miller, 54 Cal. App. 102, 201 P. 
932.'' 
The holding of Hannah vs. Pogue (supra) was fol-
lowed in the later leading case of Board of Trustees of 
Leland Sta1zj'ord, Jr., University v. Miller et al., 54 Cal. 
App. 102, 201 Pac. 952 (Hearing denied by Supreme 
Court), where upon a boundary line contest the lower 
court held that an old fence line had been established 
by mutual agreement some 660 feet away from the 
survey line dividing the properties. The question on 
appeal was "whether there is evidence to support the 
finding that the predecessors in title of the ·parties 
established such boundary line by mutual agreement. 
There is no direct evidence of such an agreement, and 
the question must, therefore, be determined from the 
conduct of the respective owners of the lands, viewed 
in the light of the surrounding circumstances.'' The 
evidence showed payment of taxes according to the 
record title but respect and acquiescence in the fence 
as the boundary together with use of the land in the 
proprietary sense by the adjoining parties right up to 
the fence on each side for more than forty years. In 
affirming the lower court the court said at page 953 of 
201 Pac.: 
''There is no direct evidence to that effect ( un-
certainty as to the location of the true boundary 
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line), but, n~ stated the facts found to t.)x ist justi-
fy the inference that the adjoining owner~ had 
a·greed upon the }oration of the boundary. rrl~is 
inference is of a valid agreement, and necessarily 
implies that there was an unt.•ertainty as to the 
true line. 'The doctrine of an agreed boundary 
line and its binding effects upon the coterminous 
owners rests fundamentally upon the fact that 
there is, or is believed by all parties to be, an 
uncertainty as to the location of the true line ... 
This does not mean that the inferenee of an agree-
ment arising from acquiescence does not support 
the added inference that the inferred agreement 
was based on a questioned boundary. The pri-
mary inference is of a valid pre-existing agree-
ment, and to be valid that agreement must have 
been based on a doubtful boundary line.' Clapp 
v. Churchill, 164 Cal. 7 45, 130 Pac. 1062." 
The matter of determining a boundary by an old 
fence line where the old fence may be located apart 
from the survey line between adjoining owners is settled 
in the leading Utah case of Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 Utah 
31, 276 Pac. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1418, et seq. In that case 
an old fence was located some distance from the survey 
line between adjoining owners, and at the time the 
fence was located, both parties knew the fence did not 
coincide with the true survey line. There were no per-
manent improvements of any kind involved, and the 
Court held that under those circumstances the old fence 
line could not be considered the boundary line between 
the parties. The specific issue in the ease is set out at 
P. 917 of 276 Pac. as follows: 
''It thus becomes of controlling importance to 
determine whether two adjacent landowners may 
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establish a boundary line between their lands by 
oral agreement or by acquiescence for a long 
period of time, when there is no uncertainty as 
to the location of the true boundary line, and 
where it is known by them at all times that the 
boundary line sought to be established is not the 
tr_ue boundary line. . . . Neither are we dealing 
with a case where any permanent improvements 
have been placed upon the land in reliance upon 
an established boundary line.'' 
The important thing about the opinion is that the court 
reiterates and states the supporting rule in many cases 
in Utah in connection with establishment of a boundary 
by an old fence line, as follows: 
''Counsel for defendants cite and rely upon the 
rule announced by this court in the following 
cases: Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah, 269, 87 P. 1009; 
~Loyer v. Langton, 37 Utah, 9, 106 P. 509; Rydalch 
v. Anderson, 37 Utah, 99, 107 P. 25; Young Y. 
Hyland, 37 Utah 229, 108 P. 1124; Farr Y. 
Thomas, 41 Utah 1, 122 P. 906; Binford v. Eccles, 
41 Utah 457, 126 P. 333; Christensen v. Beultner, 
42 Utah, 392, 131 P. 666; Tanner v. Stratton, 44 
Utah 253, 139 P. 940; Warren v. Mazzuchi, 45 
Utah 612, 148 P. 360; VanCott v. Casper, 53 Utah 
161, 176 P. 849. In these cases the rule is an-
nounced and reiterated that, where the owners 
of adjoining lands occupy their respective prem-
ises up to a certain line which they mutually rec-
ognize as the boundcuy line for a long period of 
time, they and their grantees may not deny that 
the boundary line thus recognized is the true one. 
The general rule thus repeatedly enunciated has 
beeome the settled law in this jurisdiction. How-
ever, the question for determination in this case 
is whether the facts here bring it "\vithin the gen-
eral rule or constitute an exception thereto." 
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CONCLUSION 
Under the eonclusiYe facts as indieated above by 
the evidenee and in accordance with the law eitt>d, it is 
respectfully submitted that the distrid court erred, its 
decree must be reversed and the defendants and appel-
lants are entitled to a decree and judgment in one or 
more respects together with findings and conclusions in 
accordance therewith as is indicated below. 
1. That plaintiffs are barred by Section 104-2-5, 
104-2-6 and/or 104-2-24, Utah Code .Annotated, 1943, 
from 
a. Instituting or maintaining this action at all, or 
b. Bringing or maintaining the action as to any 
construction by the defendants with particular ref-
erence to five cabins first constructed, renovated, or 
completed by defendants on or before 1\iay 6, 1946. 
2. Defendants have with their predecessors in title 
acquired a perpetual easement to the use of the land 
of the plaintiffs which might be found to be encroached 
upon. 
a. To continue to use the same to the same extent 
as such use was continually made beginning in 1912 
and continuing thereafter until 1943 and probably 
the fall of 1948. 
b. To use the same for general proprietory pur-
poses as used since 1911. 
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3. That the legal boundary Jine between the parties 
has been and is now the old fence line location since the 
establishment of the same as the boundary between the 
parties in 1911 or 1912, and plaintiffs are not entitled to 
an injunction requiring defendants to move construc-
tion from or pay damages for any land built upon by 
defendants southward of the old fence line between the 
parties, and plaintiffs are now estopped to claim the 
land south of the old fence line. 
4. That defendants should in equity be required 
in the event of a finding of any encroachment upon the 
plaintiffs' land to pay to plaintiffs the market value of 
such land encroached upon, and plaintiffs should be 
denied an injunction requiring defendants to remove 
any of the permanent sewer line and cabin renovation 
or construction effected by them. 
5. That a ne'v trial should be granted defendants 
and appellants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PERRY H. BURNHAM, 
'VILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
Received copies of the foregoing brief this 11th 
day of December, 1950. 
Attorney for the Plainf'iff s 
and Responde,nts. 
42 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
